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TRUSTS-LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS-CONTINGENT UNFUNDED LIFE INSURANCE TRUST AS TESTAMENTARY D1spos1TION-Settlor named defendant bank
beneficiary of eight insurance policies on his life. At the same time he
entered into a trust agreement with the bank under which the bank was to
hold the policies until the death of the settlor and, upon his death, collect
the proceeds and distribute them according to one of two alternate methods
of distribution. If his wife elected to reject the provisions made for her in
his will and insisted on her statutory share of his estate, then the insurance
proceeds were to be divided info four equal parts and paid to his four
daughters. If, however, the wife elected to take under the will (under
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which she received about one-fifth of the estate), the insurance money was
to be divided into five equal parts to be paid to his wife and four daughters. Settlor died some two and a half years later leaving both the will and
trust agreement still in force although he had reserved the right to revoke
the trust at any time. His widow attacked the trust agreement as testamentary and prayed that the trustee be ordered to pay over the proceeds
of the policies to the executor of the settlor's estate. A demurrer by the
trustee and other defendants was sustained, and the widow appealed.
Held, three justices dissenting, since during the life of the settlor no legal
interest passed to the trustee and no equitable interest passed to the beneficiaries of the trust, the instrument was void as a testamentary disposition
not executed in accordance with the statute of wills. Bickers v. Shenandoah
Valley Nat. Bank, (Va. 1955) 88 S.E. (2d) 889.
In view of the widespread use and undoubted value of the insurance
trust in the field of estate planning,1 the cloud which this decision casts on
the validity of such trusts in Virginia is to be regretted. The statement of
the court that no interest passed to the trustee during the life of the settlor
is certainly an anomaly in view of the fact that the trustee was named beneficiary of the life insurance policies. Though often referred to as a "mere
expectancy,''2 and having few of the earmarks of a property interest, the
interest which the beneficiary of a life insurance policy has in the proceeds
has always been recognized as sufficient to keep such policies out of the
category of testamentary dispositions. In support of its holding on this
point the court cited language in the trust agreement which seemed to
indicate that the trustee did not have any rights in the policies prior to
the death of the settlor.3 The fallacy in this, of course, is that the trust
agreement was in no way concerned with any transfer to the trustee. That
had already been accomplished the moment the trustee was made beneficiary of the policies. The trust agreement dealt only with the duties of
the trustee toward this "expectancy," which the court readily conceded
could have been made the subject matter of a trust if it had been transferred to the trustee.4 The second ground upon which the decision rested
is equally open to criticism. The court took the view that since the trust
was dependent on the existence of a valid will (and thus the beneficiaries
l For interesting discussions of the practical advantages of life insurance trusts from
the insurance man's point of view, see Nippert, "Contingent Life Insurance Trusts," 5
J. AM. Soc. C.L.U. 166 (1951); Stephenson, "Reappraising Insurance Trusts," 4 J. AM.
Soc. C.L.U. 218 (1950).
,
2 Smith v. Coleman, 184 Va. 259, 35 S.E. (2d) 107 (1945); Walker v. Penick's Executor,
122 Va. 664, 95 S.E. 428 (1918); Davis v. Modem Industrial Bank, 279 N.Y. 405, 18 N.E.
(2d) 639 (1939). A minority of courts speak of the beneficiary's interest as vested subject
to defeasance. See, e.g., Indiana Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 180 Ind. 9, 101 N.E. 289
(1913).
3 "The trustee's only rights in the trust and policies placed in safekeeping prior to
the death of the settler, are to hold the policies in safekeeping until and unless they are
withdrawn by the settler." Principal case at 893-894, n. I.
4 Principal case at 892. The proposition that the right of the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy to recover the proceeds may be held in trust has been uniformly affirmed.
See, e.g.: Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934); Gordon v.
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could not be ascertained until after the death of the settlor), no equitable
interest in the corpus of the trust passed to anyone in the lifetime of the
settlor. As the dissenting opinion forcefully pointed out, the trust instrument transferred "contingent springing limitations" to the wife and four
daughters of the settlor.5 The overwhelming weight of authority recognizes
a contingent interest passing to the beneficiary as sufficient to support an
inter vivos trust, 6 and the fact that the contingency will not take place until
after the death of the settlor should not make the interest any less a present
one. It is true that possession and enjoyment of the insurance proceeds by
the beneficiaries of the trust was dependent on the existence of a will, but
if a contingent interest is recognized as a subject of present ownership, it
is misleading to say that the trust itself was dependent on the will.
As several authorities have pointed out, any insurance trust is at least
very similar to a testamentary disposition, but due to the fact that the
danger of fraud is almost non-existent, the policy of the law has uniformly
been to uphold such trusts as useful and legitimate devices for disposing of
insurance proceeds.7 There is nothing in the court's opinion which indicates a different view of the insurance trust per se. On the contrary, the
court went to some length to limit its holding to the facts of the case.8 The
fact that the trust was designed to avoid the operation of the Virginia
statute giving a surviving spouse a one-third share of a decedent's estate9
may have played some part in the result reached, although the court specifically reserved this question. 10 If, in a later case, the Virginia court does
decide that a revocable trust is void when attacked by a surviving spouse,
it will be going against the result reached in the great majority of the
jurisdictions which have encountered that situation.11 Considering these
factors along with the strong dissent by three justices, it is not likely that
this decision will mean the end of the insurance trust in Virginia. In the
future, however, draftsmen of such trust instruments, in Virginia as elsewhere, would do well to express clearly the intent to transfer (1) a present
interest to the trustee and, (2) a present, equitable interest to designated
beneficiaries. In addition, if alternate methods of distribution are desired,
as in the grincipal case, one of them should be definitely prescribed with
the alternative plan phrased in terms of condition subsequent.

Jerome K. Walsh, Jr.
Portland Trust Bank, 201 Ore. 648, 271 P. (2d) 653 (1954), noted in Z7 ROCKY MT. L.
REv. 240 (1955).
5 Principal case at 902.
6 SCOlT, LAW OF TRUSTS §56.5 (1939); BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS §38 (1952).
7 SMITH, PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS 75 (1950); SCOlT, LAw OF ThuSTS §57.3
(1939); Phillips, "The Testamentary Character of Personal Unfunded Life Insurance
Trusts," 82 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 700 (1934).
s Principal case at 895-896.
9 Va. Code (1950) tit. 64, §§64-13, 64-16.
10 See note 8 supra.
11 See 40 GEO. L.J. 109 (1951).

